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Brazil and the Durban Platform. 
Ambitions and Expectations 
Markus Fraundorfer and Florian Rabitz
Brazil, together with other emerging powers, has repeatedly made headlines over the 
last few years as a serious player in international climate change negotiations. In De-
cember 2015 states will convene at the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris to agree 
on a new international climate treaty. What can we expect from Brazil at the upcoming 
climate summit? What can we expect from the negotiations on a new climate treaty in 
the context of the Durban Platform? 
Analysis
This issue of the GIGA Focus discusses Brazil’s potential role at the upcoming UN 
Climate Change Conference, analysing if Brazil’s expected contributions can keep up 
with its ambitious rhetoric.
  Brazil’s presently low emissions trajectory is a result of reduced deforestation rates. 
With greenhouse gas emissions from all other sources increasing, an ambitious con-
tribution to global post-2020 mitigation requires more stringent action. However, 
it is unlikely that Brazil will take ambitious measures in areas other than forestry.
  While Brazilian climate diplomacy puts a rhetorical premium on historical respon-
sibility, its substantive contribution to the negotiation process is only moderately 
progressive. The proposal of “concentric differentiation” offers a way to implement 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibility in line with current reali-
ties while allowing for the obligations of Annex I (mostly developed countries) and 
major non–Annex I parties (mostly developing countries) to converge in the long 
term.
  The present context of the international negotiations is generally favourable to-
wards Brazilian participation. The main challenge will be to conclude a transparen-
cy regime which facilitates collective action by allowing for adequate internation-
al review of domestic policies. To that end, the principle of common but differenti-
ated responsibility should be implemented under the Paris agreement in a manner 
which aligns with the convention’s long-term objective.
Keywords: Brazil, Durban Platform, greenhouse gas emissions, Paris, UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change
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Introduction
At the 17th Conference of the Parties to the Unit-
ed Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) in Durban in 2011, parties 
agreed to negotiate a new legally binding inter-
national climate treaty by the end of 2015 called 
the Durban Platform (UNFCCC 2014). With only 
months left until the 21st Conference of the Parties 
in Paris, the role and contribution of major emerg-
ing economies under a post-2020 climate agree-
ment remains one of the most critical issues. The 
new agreement, “a protocol, another legal instru-
ment or an agreed outcome with legal force un-
der the Convention applicable to all parties,” is to 
be based on parties’ nationally determined contri-
butions (NDCs)1 and has the ultimate objective of 
holding global average temperature increases be-
low 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels.
The role of the new emerging powers will be 
critical to any international climate deal. These 
new powers demonstrated their political clout for 
the first time at the 2009 climate change confer-
ence in Copenhagen, when they formed the BASIC 
group (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) and 
negotiated the final wording of the Copenhagen 
Accord with the United States. Given that these 
emerging countries have further intensified their 
coordination in order to exercise more influence 
in the context of international climate change pol-
icy, no deal will be possible without them. This 
paper assesses the role of Brazil within the ongo-
ing negotiation process of the Durban Platform 
and attempts to draw conclusions about what we 
may expect from this country at the Paris climate 
change summit later this year. 
Brazil’s prospects for inspiring international ac-
tion are currently clouded by domestic turmoil and 
a paralysed government. Brazil’s incumbent pres-
ident, Dilma Rousseff, has largely failed to build 
on her predecessor’s national and international 
successes, which contributed to establishing Bra-
zil as a promising new player on the international 
stage. The spirit of optimism from the Lula years 
(2003–2010) has largely evaporated, and the Brazil-
ian government under Rousseff has been fighting a 
stubborn economic recession. In addition, the gov-
ernment has been facing countrywide civil society 
1 After the successful conclusion of the negotiations for a trea-
ty the so-called INDCs (intended nationally determined con-
tributions) become NDCs (nationally determined contribu-
tions).
mass protests fuelled by Brazilians’ dissatisfaction 
with the dire state of Brazil’s infrastructure, pub-
lic health system, and public education system. If 
this were not enough, the government has been 
weakened by a gigantic corruption scandal involv-
ing the ruling Workers’ Party, the state-controlled 
oil company Petrobras, and various other leading 
construction companies. Heavily besieged at home 
and lacking Lula’s extraordinary leadership qual-
ities, Rousseff has been unable to further Brazil’s 
position on the international stage. 
With Brazil’s government and president un-
der extreme pressure, what can we expect from 
the country during this pivotal moment in the cli-
mate treaty negotiations? In the following analy-
sis, we ask three interrelated questions: First, to 
what extent does Brazil’s domestic context align 
with the objective of the negotiation process? Sec-
ond, to what extent is the international context 
conducive to Brazilian participation in the agree-
ment? Third, what is Brazil’s role in the ongoing 
diplomatic process? 
The Domestic Context
Brazil is quite vulnerable to climate change and 
is already experiencing shifts in precipitation pat-
terns and changes in regional temperatures (IPCC 
2014). Recent droughts and floods have been par-
tially attributed to the consequences of climat-
ic change, and their frequency is expected to in-
crease in the future (INPE and Met Office 2011). 
Climate-related GDP losses could amount to BRL 
719 billion (in 2008 prices) by 2050 according to 
optimistic estimations or BRL 3.655 trillion ac-
cording to pessimistic estimations (Margulis and 
Dubeux 2010: 52–54). The Amazon region is par-
ticularly sensitive to climate change, with temper-
atures estimated to increase by 2.3°C–8.9ºC by the 
2090s (INPE and Met Office 2011: 41). Brazil’s po-
sition as a leading exporter of agricultural prod-
ucts represents another Achilles’ heel. Should 
temperatures increase by 3.5ºC, farm property 
values would be expected to drop by up to 38.5 
per cent (Sanghi and Mendelsohn 2008). Such an 
impact on the agriculture sector would negative-
ly affect both Brazil’s balance of trade and domes-
tic food prices (World Bank 2013). In addition, the 
production of both biofuel and hydropower, the 
mainstays of Brazilian clean energy, would likely 
suffer (CEBDS 2013).
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Historically, the lion’s share of Brazilian emis-
sions came from deforestation. The country’s im-
proved regulation of deforestation has thus result-
ed in its presently low emissions trajectory. The 
2004 Plan of Action for the Prevention and Con-
trol of Deforestation in the Amazon strengthened 
enforcement of forest regulations and allowed for 
the use of satellites to track deforestation in real 
time. In 2008 the National Congress established 
the Amazon Fund to improve forest management 
and conservation. Mainly financed by Norway 
and, to a lesser extent, Germany and Petrobras, 
the fund has so far approved 50 projects with a to-
tal volume of USD 329 million; it is considered one 
of the most ambitious projects of its kind (Ama-
zon Fund 2014). However, the anti-deforestation 
movement suffered a major setback in 2012 fol-
lowing the National Congress’s decision to mod-
ify the 1965 Forest Code – legislation designed to 
protect Brazil’s rainforests (Tollefson 2013). The 
revised code has been criticised due to its amnes-
ty provisions and lax restoration requirements for 
illegally deforested land (Soares-Filho et al. 2014).
Given the reduction in deforestation, emissions 
from land-use change and forestry have declined 
accordingly, from 816 MtCO2e in 1990 to 476 Mt-
CO2e in 2012. In the same period, however, emis-
sions from energy and agriculture grew from 195 
MtCO2e to 440 MtCO2e and from 304 MtCO2e to 
440 MtCO2e, respectively (OC 2014). Sizeable in-
creases from fugitive emissions, transport, and in-
dustrial processes are expected in the near future 
(MME 2013: 346). Increased emissions from ener-
gy are due to the growing share of oil and gas in 
the national energy mix. While electricity from hy-
dropower still accounts for 64 per cent of installed 
capacity (EPE 2014: 45), fluctuations in supply 
caused by droughts have led to a stronger reliance 
on natural gas. Proven domestic oil reserves have 
doubled between 1998 and 2010 (Costa et al. 2015), 
and the transport sector’s demand for fuel is on-
ly partially being met through biofuels. Yet, de-
spite the bioethanol sector facing headwinds due 
to a price cap on petrol, domestic production is ex-
pected to reach 50 billion litres in 2020 – up from 
16 billion in 2005 (OECD / FAO 2011: 84).
A further challenge is energy efficiency. Losses 
from transmission and distribution amounted to 
16 per cent of total output in 2011. Although this is 
in line with the regional average, it compares un-
favourably to other upper middle-income coun-
tries. The development of non-hydropower re-
newables remains sluggish. In 2011 the installed 
capacities of wind energy and photovoltaic ener-
gy amounted to 2,202 MW and 5 MW, respective-
ly (EPE 2014: 45). However, significant scope for 
expansion exists, with Brazil receiving annual so-
lar radiation of between 1,500 kWh/m2 and 2,200 
kWh/m2 (Rüther and Zilles 2011: 1027). Solar en-
ergy also offers significant co-benefits, such as 
(a) reduced dependence on Bolivian gas imports, 
which has caused concerns regarding energy se-
curity in the past; (b) the seasonal availability of 
solar- and hydropower being anticyclical (Rüther 
and Zilles 2011: 1027); and (c) improved access to 
energy and decentralised electricity generation, 
resulting in reduced losses from transmission and 
distribution.
Various policy frameworks address climate 
change both directly and indirectly. The 2008 Na-
tional Plan on Climate Change aimed to reduce de-
forestation rates by 40 per cent between 2006 and 
2009, by a further 30 per cent by 2013, and anoth-
er 30 per cent by 2017. The plan’s other measures 
include (i) improvements to energy efficiency and 
conservation in the order of 106 TWh by 2030, (ii) 
the replacement of 10 million refrigerators over a 
10-year period, (iii) a 20 per cent increase in the 
recycling of urban solid waste by 2015, (iv) the re-
duction of non-technical losses in electricity dis-
tribution by 10,000 GWh over 10 years, and (v) the 
addition of 34,460 MW from hydropower.
Despite not yet publishing its intended na-
tionally determined contribution (INDC), Bra-
zil pledged at Copenhagen 2009 to reduce emis-
sions by 36.1 to 38.9 per cent by 2020, according 
to business-as-usual conditions. The pledge is 
based on abating emissions of 670 MtCO2e from 
the Amazon and the Cerrado, 83 MtCO2e–104 Mt-
CO2e through the restoration of grazing land, 48 
MtCO2e–60 MtCO2e through the increased use of 
biofuels, and 79 MtCO2e–99 MtCO2e by expand-
ing hydropower. On the domestic level, a 2010 
presidential decree established specific targets 
for the 2008 National Plan. The decree assumes 
a business-as-usual scenario of 3,236 MtCO2e for 
2020 as the baseline for the domestic target. This 
scenario is at the upper limit of available projec-
tions (PBL 2013), with the reduction target of 36.1 
per cent–38.9 per cent thus being easier to reach 
than it would be under less pessimistic assump-
tions. Still, this target is expected to lead to a 6 per 
cent–10 per cent decrease in emissions by 2020 rel-
ative to 2005 – a more ambitious commitment than 
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the targets of other non–Annex I parties (La Rov-
ere et al. 2013: 72–73). The decree also establishes 
the following sector-specific targets: (a) an 80 per 
cent reduction in deforestation in the Amazon rel-
ative to the 1996–2005 average and a 40 per cent 
reduction in the Cerrado relative to the 1999–2008 
average, (b) the restoration of 15 million ha of de-
graded pastures, (c) expansion of biological nitro-
gen fixation by 5.5 million ha in order to reduce 
the use of nitrogen fertilisers, and (d) afforestation 
totalling 3 million ha.
A Brazilian domestic climate policy that focus-
es on deforestation will not be able to sufficiently 
limit emissions in the post-2020 period (La Rovere 
et al. 2013). While there is significant scope for ex-
panding renewable energies and energy efficien-
cy, Brazil’s domestic policy lacks clear, quantified, 
long-term targets for the expansion of renewable 
energies other than hydropower (IRENA 2012; 
2015). Also, the stated aim of establishing a nation-
wide cap-and-trade system has, so far, not materi-
alised. Brazil’s contributions to international mit-
igation efforts thus depend on measures in areas 
such as energy efficiency and grid infrastructure, 
non-hydropower renewables, agriculture, and fu-
el. Brazil’s capacity for abating greenhouse gas 
emissions presently outstrips its willingness. Be-
yond deforestation control, the regulation of biofu-
els is an exception here, with mandatory blending 
levels for petrol and, more recently, diesel having 
repeatedly been ratcheted up (Fraundorfer 2015: 
136–142). With rising emissions expected from 
transportation, this policy instrument in princi-
ple allows for the direct control of fuel demand. As 
the next section shows, however, Brazil appears to 
be unwilling to bring far-reaching contributions to 
the international negotiating table. This unwilling-
ness is unfortunate considering both the country’s 
vulnerabilities to climate change and the scope for 
“no regrets” options.
International Negotiations
The failure to adopt a follow-up agreement to the 
Kyoto Protocol at the 2009 Copenhagen conference 
has been mainly attributed to Brazil, China, and 
India, which “unapologetically trumpeted their 
freedom of economic development regardless of 
environmental impact” (Dimitrov 2010: 817). Un-
like the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris agreement is to 
be based on NDCs, which “may include, as ap-
propriate, inter alia, quantifiable information on 
the reference point (including, as appropriate, a 
base year), time frames and/or periods for imple-
mentation, scope and coverage, planning process-
es, assumptions and methodological approaches.” 
While the Brazilian INDC is expected in October 
2015, a US–Brazilian joint statement on climate 
change from July 2015 sets out a number of targets 
and actions that allow for a preliminary assess-
ment of Brazil’s ambition. In the statement, Bra-
zil commits itself to generating 20 per cent of its 
electricity through renewable energies other than 
hydropower by 2030. Although it appears to have 
acknowledged the necessity to expand alternative 
energy sources, the target proposed by Brazil is 
remarkably low. As of 2015 non-hydro renewables 
already account for 18 per cent of installed capac-
ity, and projections show that the 20 per cent tar-
get will be achieved in 2017 (MME 2013: 93). Bra-
zil is also committed to reforesting and restoring 
an area of 12 million ha by 2030. This goal is equal-
ly lacking in ambition considering that the revised 
Forest Code already requires ~21 million ha to be 
restored (Soares-Filho et al. 2014: 363). The com-
mitment to objectives which are significantly be-
low business-as-usual conditions, as well as the 
absence of either economy-wide or sectoral tar-
gets, suggests that Brazil is unlikely to assume 
“progressions beyond the current undertaking,” 
as set out at the 2014 Lima climate talks. This is in 
line with a 2011 shift towards more conservative 
policy objectives (Viola and Basso 2015: 441–444).
Besides the question of whether Brazil’s even-
tual NDC will make a sufficient contribution to 
keeping global warming under the 2ºC limit, a 
critical issue within the Paris agreement will be 
the transparency of action. At Copenhagen, de-
spite its relatively ambitious pledge (La Rovere et 
al. 2013), Brazil – as well as the other members of 
the BASIC coalition – refused to subject the imple-
mentation of its pledges to stringent measuring, 
reporting, and verification (Dimitrov 2010). Since 
the Cancun summit, a differentiated regime of in-
ternational assessment and review (for Annex I 
parties) and international consultation and analy-
sis (for non–Annex I parties) has been developed 
(van Asselt et al. 2015). While numerous develop-
ing countries seek to uphold this approach, de-
veloped countries prefer to merge the two tracks 
(ENB 2014). Under the current two-tiered system, 
the reporting carried out by non–Annex I parties 
frequently does not allow for the tracking of prog-
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ress towards national emissions targets; more-
over, few non–Annex I parties submit their bien-
nial update reports in the first place (Deprez et al. 
2015). Although Brazil has shown itself willing to 
contribute to global mitigation efforts, given the 
substantial incentives to free ride, any pledges/
NDCs are only as good as the ability to verify their 
implementation.
Beyond Brazil’s apparent lack of ambition re-
garding emission targets and the unresolved is-
sue of transparency, further controversy revolves 
around the question to what extent “self-differen-
tiation” at the level of NDCs is complemented by 
differentiation under the international framework 
of the Paris agreement. Brazil has always been a 
fervent advocate of the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility. For instance, it not-
ed on behalf of the BASIC group that “the so-
called ‘self differentiation’ approach is not consis-
tent with the principles and provisions of the Con-
vention, nor with the Durban mandate or the Li-
ma Call for Climate Action” (Brazil 2015). The im-
portance Brazil places on common but differenti-
ated responsibility is also reflected in its calls for 
the development of methodologies for assessing 
historical responsibility for climate change (Bra-
zil 2013).
However, the concept of “concentric differenti-
ation” proposed by Brazil at the Lima conference 
in 2014 allows for, in theory, the implementation 
of the principle of common but differentiated re-
sponsibility in a way which goes beyond the dis-
tinction between Annex I and non–Annex I. Ac-
cording to the proposal, Annex I parties would 
be obliged to include “quantified, economy-wide, 
absolute emission limitation or reduction tar-
gets in relation to a baseline year” in their NDCs. 
Meanwhile, least developed countries would be 
“encouraged” to include non-economy-wide ac-
tions, whereas developing countries would be ex-
pected to utilise quantified, relative targets (emis-
sions intensity, per capita emissions, or business-
as-usual deviation). The latter group could grad-
ually move towards absolute targets “in accor-
dance with their national circumstances, devel-
opment levels and capabilities” (Brazil 2014). This 
leaves the door open for a long-term convergence 
between the obligations of developed and major 
developing countries.
The 2014 Lima conference was silent on the 
(mandatory or voluntary) inclusion of means of 
implementation. This has caused some concern 
amongst developing countries about whether de-
veloped countries will uphold their financial com-
mitments towards the Green Climate Fund. Like 
other major non–Annex I emitters, Brazil does not 
require direct financial transfers to support mit-
igation and adaptation. Of larger importance is 
the status of the REDD+ mechanism (designed 
to reduce emissions from deforestation and for-
est degradation, foster conservation and sustain-
able forest management, and enhance forest car-
bon stocks)2 and the Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDM) under the Paris agreement. 
At the 2015 Bonn conference REDD+ became 
the first agreed-on element of the Paris treaty, 
with consensus now existing on non-carbon ben-
efits, joint mitigation and adaptation approach-
es, and, most importantly, safeguards. The Bonn 
text leaves open whether REDD+ will allow for 
the transfer of emissions rights through carbon 
credits, or whether it will be financed through re-
sults-based payments. Expecting larger financial 
flows from the former, the Coalition for Rainfor-
est Nations (of which Brazil is not a member) has 
proposed the creation of a new market mecha-
nism linked to REDD+ under the Paris agreement 
(CRN 2015). Unlike for many other countries with 
large forest covers, market-based REDD+ financ-
ing is not a viable option for Brazil. Considering 
its emissions profile, any ambitious Brazilian con-
tribution to global mitigation efforts precludes the 
large-scale transfer of emissions rights through 
carbon markets. Financing REDD+ through emis-
sions trading would prevent Brazil from using the 
“easy” option of deforestation control to count 
towards its NDCs. However, although the fed-
eral government has repeatedly positioned itself 
against generating carbon credits through avoid-
ed deforestation, various Amazonian states con-
sider it to be a viable option. Presently, the state 
of Acre is negotiating with the US state of Califor-
nia regarding the use of credits generated through 
avoided deforestation within the Californian cap-
and-trade system (Roessing 2015).
It is unclear which role a revised CDM will play 
in the Paris agreement. Emissions trading is not 
part of the Durban Platform’s mandate, and the im-
plementation thereof requires common account-
ing standards to avoid double counting. Howev-
er, Brazil is a major stakeholder in the CDM, host-
2 REDD+ is intended to be an international framework for sus-
tainable forest management and the reduction of CO2 emis-
sions resulting from deforestation. 
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ing 337 registered CDM projects with over 100 
million certified emissions reductions issued since 
2005. Brazil advocates reform of the CDM in or-
der to make the reforestation of areas with “for-
ests in exhaustion” an eligible activity. This allows 
the generation of tradable carbon credits through 
the clearing of severely degraded forests and their 
subsequent replacement with new plantations.3
Brazil’s involvement in the Durban Platform 
negotiations is thus ambivalent. While it is un-
likely that ambitious targets are forthcoming un-
der the Brazilian INDC, the proposal for concen-
tric differentiation is a step forwards from the sta-
tus quo. In addition, there are elements – such as 
a reformed CDM or a results-based REDD+ mech-
anism – on which Brazil is clearly a demandeur. 
Considering the current domestic turbulence it is 
experiencing, Brazil faces additional challenges 
in constructively engaging with the diplomatic 
process.
Conclusion: Lack of Ambition, not Capacity
Brazil’s role within the present climate negotia-
tions is ambivalent. On the one hand, its current 
emissions trajectory requires stringent actions in 
areas beyond forestry. Scope for such actions ex-
ists and, in the case of non-hydro renewable ener-
gies, promises significant co-benefits. As a central 
player in the present negotiation process, if Bra-
zil were to take ambitious actions, it would send a 
powerful signal both to other major emitters and 
to its neighbours – who as members of the Like-
Minded Group of Developing Countries (LMDC) 
are reluctant to take actions of their own. Sending 
such a signal would facilitate international efforts 
to keep global warming within manageable lim-
its, which should be a matter of self-interest in the 
Brazilian case. The 2014 Lima proposal for con-
centric differentiation also shows a general will-
ingness of the Brazilian government to apply the 
principle of common but differentiated respon-
sibility to contemporary realities; this sets Brazil 
apart from numerous other non–Annex I parties, 
such as the LMDC.
On the other hand, Brazil’s willingness to take 
effective measures beyond deforestation control 
is rather low. For the post-2020 phase, mitigation 
will require focusing not only on the “low-hang-
3 FCCC/SBSTA/2011/Misc.12.
ing fruit” of forestry but equally on renewable 
energies, energy efficiency (including grid infra-
structure), agriculture, and fuel. This will also re-
quire improved streamlining of domestic policies 
as well as quantified, verifiable indicators. On the 
international level, policies must be subject to suf-
ficient measurement, reporting, and verification 
in order to ensure the NDCs are being implement-
ed and thus facilitating collective action. Beyond 
the raising of domestic ambition, any differentia-
tion in the types of international review must en-
sure an adequate degree of transparency.
Finally, with its strong historical commitment 
to multilateralism and a rule-based internation-
al order (de Lima and Hirst 2006), ambitious and 
transparent actions would open the way towards 
greater Brazilian leadership both regionally and 
internationally. Over the last decade, Brazil has 
shown considerable leadership on various devel-
opment issues (health, food security, and bioener-
gy) based on a multilateral approach, which has 
seen it work with states from the developed world 
and the Global South (Fraundorfer 2015). While 
the future of the UNFCCC regime is far from clear, 
a strong Brazilian contribution would almost cer-
tainly translate into increased recognition. Thus, 
there are very few reasons against Brazil scaling 
up its climate policy, but numerous in favour.
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